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Abstract Although cognitive control and reinforcement
learning have been researched extensively over the last few
decades, only recently have studies investigated their
interrelationship. An important unanswered question con-
cerns how the control system decides what task to execute
and how vigorously to carry out the task once selected.
Based on a recent theory of control formulated according to
principles of hierarchical reinforcement learning, we asked
whether rewards can affect top-down control over task
performance at the level of task representation. Participants
were rewarded for correctly performing only one of two
tasks in a standard task-switching experiment. Reaction
times and error rates were lower for the reinforced task
compared to the non-reinforced task. Moreover, the switch
cost in error rates for the non-reinforced task was signifi-
cantly larger compared to the reinforced task, especially for
trials in which the imperative stimulus afforded different
responses for the two tasks, resulting in a ‘‘non-paradoxi-
cal’’ asymmetric switch cost. These findings suggest that
reinforcement at the task level resulted in greater applica-
tion of top-down control rather than in stronger stimulus–
response pathways for the rewarded task.
Introduction
Cognitive control refers to a collection of neurocognitive
processes that facilitate execution of non-automatic or
effortful behaviors, especially in stimulus-impoverished or
novel environments with few cues for guiding action
selection, or when misleading cues elicit prepotent actions
that conflict with task goals (Norman & Shallice, 1986). An
influential theory of automaticity and control based on
principles of parallel distributed processing proposes that
‘‘top-down’’ control signals bias information processing
along neural pathways that implement task rules (Cohen,
Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990). According to this proposal,
‘‘easy’’ tasks are characterized by strong connection
strengths along stimulus–response pathways that facilitate
fast and accurate responses, whereas ‘‘hard’’ tasks are
associated with relatively weaker connection strengths.
Stimuli that exhibit characteristics of both tasks—such as
the incompatible stimuli in the Stroop task (Stroop,
1935)—automatically evoke responses appropriate to the
easy task even when the hard task is called for. Under these
circumstances, a top-down biasing signal associated with
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) facilitates pro-
cessing along the associated stimulus–response pathways,
enabling the correct response to win out (Miller & Cohen,
2001). Note that by definition, these models propose that
harder tasks with weak stimulus–response mappings
demand greater cognitive control, whereas easier tasks with
strong stimulus–response mapping require less cognitive
control.
Studies elaborating on this control mechanism have
accounted for a vast body of observations on trial-to-trial
changes in response times (RTs) (e.g., Botvinick, Braver,
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001;
Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009). In task-switching
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experiments, for instance, switching between tasks leads to
longer RTs and higher error rates compared to repeating
them, resulting in switch costs (SCs) (Allport, Styles, &
Hsieh, 1994; Jersild, 1927; Meiran, 1996; Rogers &
Monsell, 1995; Spector & Bierderman, 1976). Numerous
studies have observed larger SCs when switching to easy
(i.e., fast and accurate) tasks compared to switching to hard
(slow and inaccurate) tasks (Monsell, 2003). This ‘‘para-
doxical asymmetric switch cost’’ (PASC) (Fig. 1, left)
apparently results from the relatively greater difficulty of
disengaging top-down control over the harder task when
switching to the easier task (but see also Kiesel et al.,
2010).
The success of this model notwithstanding, an important
unanswered question concerns how the tasks are selected in
the first instance: how does the system determine what task
to execute and how much top-down control to apply?
Theories of action selection based on hierarchical rein-
forcement learning (HRL) present a potential solution to
this problem (Botvinick, Niv, & Barto, 2009; Botvinick,
2012; Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). Standard approaches to
reinforcement learning entail the adaptive modification of
action probabilities according to rewards and punishments
received (Thorndike, 1911; Sutton & Barto, 1998). HRL
develops this approach by representing collections of
simple actions as temporally extended behaviors called
options that are selected and manipulated at a higher level
of abstraction, which can enhance computational efficiency
for problems characterized by hierarchical structure (Bot-
vinick et al., 2009). The values of the options are then
learned according to standard principles of reinforcement
learning. Thus instead of learning from the consequences
of each individual action within an option in isolation (for
example, by learning by trial-and-error what sequence of
piano keys to press based on an audience’s reaction), HRL
groups individual action sequences into higher-level
options (such as playing Beethoven’s Piano Concerto No. 5
in E-flat major), and then learns the value of the options
(e.g., audiences like Beethoven’s Piano Concerto No. 5
more than his Piano Concerto No. 4) (Botvinick et al.,
2009). This enables the pianist to select behaviors at the
level of the musical piece, rather than at the level of the
individual actions that compose each piece.
Botvinick et al. (2009) have highlighted the similarities
between options and task sets, which have been defined as
‘‘a configuration of cognitive processes that is actively
maintained for subsequent task performance’’ (Sakai,
2008). A single task set serves to represent an entire
mapping from stimuli to responses, for example, as the
cognitive state that readies a subject to press a left button to
a green stimulus and a right button to a red stimulus. As
noted by Botvinick and colleagues, the concepts of tasks
sets and options both ‘‘postulate a unitary representation
that (1) can be selected or activated; (2) remains active for
some period of time following its initial selection; (3) leads
to the imposition of a specific stimulus–response mapping
or policy; and (4) can participate in hierarchical relations
with other representations of the same kind.’’ Further,
based on the role of DLPFC in applying top-down control
to facilitate the execution of task sets, they suggested that
option selection and maintenance occurs in DLPFC.
Alternatively, we have suggested that anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) selects options and then directs DLPFC to
apply top-down control over the associated task set, a
theory based on ACC’s demonstrated involvement in
reward processing, task maintenance, and motivational
control over effortful behavior (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012;
see also Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013).
The link between HRL and cognitive control draws
attention to the probability that reward receipt should
strongly affect cognitive control processes, an issue that
has been examined only recently (Chiew & Braver, 2011;
Krebs, Boehler, Appelbaum, & Woldorff, 2013; Krebs,
Boehler, Egner, & Woldorff, 2011; Krebs, Boehler &
Woldorff, 2010; Kruglanski, et al., 2002; Locke & Braver,
2008; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Pessoa, 2009; for work on
reward and attention, see Anderson, 2013, for a review).
These studies reported that positive affective and motiva-
tional states enhance attention and cognitive control for
task-appropriate behaviors, as reflected in reduced conflict
and improved goal maintenance (but see also Krebs et al.,
2010, 2011, and Pessoa, 2009 for opposing effects of
reward and affect, and Kanske & Kotz, 2011 for the effect
Fig. 1 Schematic illustration of patterns of switch costs as predicted
by the simple reinforcement learning (RL) account (left, ‘‘PASC’’)
and hierarchical reinforcement learning (HRL) account (right,
‘‘NASC’’). PASC paradoxical asymmetric switch cost, NASC non-
paradoxical asymmetric switch cost, R the reinforced task, NR the
non-reinforced task. The x-axis shows the predictions separately for
switch and repeat trials. The y-axis shows general performance (e.g.,
reaction times or error rates) with larger values indicating worse
performance. Note that whereas both the simple RL and HRL
accounts predict that reinforcement will improve performance for the
reinforced task, the simple RL account predicts relatively slow
switches to the reinforced task, whereas the HRL account predicts
relatively slow switches to the non-reinforced task
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of negative affect). Similarly, rule switching performance
improves when participants are exposed to events that
induce positive affect—though at the cost of increased
distractibility (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004).
Other recent studies have examined trial-to-trial adap-
tations in control following rewards and punishments
(Dreishbach & Fischer, 2012, for a review). Botvinick
(2007) proposed that task selection may be modulated by
aversive signals associated with response conflict. He
demonstrated in a voluntary task-switching experiment
(Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005) that subjects prefer tasks
that minimize the degree of conflict associated with task
switching. van Steenbergen, Band, and Hommel (2009,
2012) subsequently found that the conflict-adaptation
effect in a speeded response compatibility task (Eriksen &
Eriksen, 1974) is attenuated when the response is imme-
diately followed by random feedback indicating a financial
reward: Although participants in these tasks normally
respond faster for congruent relative to incongruent trials,
and this difference in RT is increased when the trials are
immediately preceded by congruent relative to incongruent
trials (Egner, 2007; Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992), the
effect of the preceding trial is eliminated when the response
is followed by reward (but see also Sturmer, Nigbur,
Schacht, & Sommer, 2011). By contrast, conflict-adapta-
tion effects are enhanced when reward is contingent on
actual task performance (Braem, Verguts, Roggerman, &
Notebaert, 2012; Sturmer et al., 2011). Braem et al. (2012)
also found in a task-switching paradigm that reward
interacted with response congruency but not with SCs: SCs
following incongruent trials increased after reward trials
but not after no-reward trials, again highlighting the effect
of reward on conflict adaptation.
Perhaps surprisingly, research to date has not examined
the task-specific effects of reward on cognitive control (but
see below for a discussion of a recent exception by Klein-
sorge & Rinkenauer, 2012). In the present study, we asked
whether rewards directed toward a particular task bias top-
down control over task performance. Specifically, we
investigated the task-specific effect of reward on task
switching by rewarding correct performance on a specific
task in an otherwise standard task-switching paradigm
(Monsell, 2003; Ruthruff, Remington, & Johnston, 2001;
Yeung & Monsell, 2003a). After assessing participants’
baseline performance during an initial phase, we then rein-
forced correct performance on one task but not the other.
Potential long-term effects of reinforcement were also
examined in a final phase conducted without reinforcement.
We reasoned that rewards would enhance task perfor-
mance either by reinforcing the stimulus–response con-
nection strengths (consistent with a simple RL account) or
by increasing top-down control over task performance as a
whole (consistent with an HRL account). Critically, these
two possibilities make opposing predictions related to the
SC (cf. Gilbert & Shallice, 2002). By definition, increasing
the strength of neural pathways that map task-related inputs
to outputs causes the task to become more automatic or
easier to execute (Cohen et al., 1990). As discussed above,
these stronger connection strengths should result in larger
SCs when switching to easy tasks (i.e., to the fast and
accurate, reinforced task) compared to switching to hard
tasks (i.e., to the slow and inaccurate, non-reinforced task)
(Monsell, 2003) (Fig. 1, left). For example, Yeung and
Monsell (2003b) observed that simply practicing a task
induces a PASC. By contrast, the HRL account predicts
that the reinforcement will increase top-down control over
the reinforced task, causing performance of that task to be
fast and accurate. In this case, switching to the slow and
inaccurate, non-reinforced task will yield a relatively larger
SC—that is, in a non-paradoxical asymmetric SC
(NASC)—due to the disengagement of control from the
faster and more accurate task (Fig. 1, right). Therefore, the
pattern of SCs should distinguish these two accounts:
whereas reinforcement of stimulus–response pathways
according to principles of simple RL should lead to PASCs,
we predicted that reinforcement of task representations that
apply top-down control according to principles of HRL
would yield NASCs.
Materials and methods
Participants
Sixty-four undergraduate students were recruited from the
University of Victoria Department of Psychology subject
pool to fulfill a course requirement or earn bonus credits.
All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Each also received a monetary bonus in addition to the
credits, the amount of which depended on their task per-
formance (see below). All subjects provided informed
consent as approved by the local research ethics commit-
tee. The experiment was conducted in accordance with the
ethical standards prescribed in the 1964 Declaration of
Helsinki.
Task design
Subjects were seated comfortably in the lab in front of a
computer monitor (1024 by 1280 pixels) and a keyboard at
a distance of about 60 cm. The task was programmed in
Matlab (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) using the Psy-
chophysics Toolbox extension (Brainard 1997; Pelli,
1997). Subjects rested the fingertips of their index fingers
comfortably on two response keys (see below) of the
computer keyboard. They performed a digit and a letter
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task modeled after a standard task-switching design
(Monsell, 2003; Ruthruff et al., 2001; Yeung & Monsell,
2003a). Subjects were instructed verbally that they were
required to perform two simple tasks that sometimes
repeated and sometimes switched from trial to trial. Each
trial started with a blank screen (800 ms) followed by a
‘‘D’’ or ‘‘L’’ cue in the center (100 ms, 1.1 by 1 square
visual angles in Courier New font, the Matlab default),
which signaled to the subjects that they should perform the
digit or letter task on that trial, respectively (Fig. 2); the
task was randomly determined on each trial. Then, the
imperative stimulus appeared in the center of the screen
(1.2 by 2.4 square visual angle). Stimuli included eight
digits (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, or 9) for the digit task and eight
letters (i, b, e, f, o, p, u, or x) for the letter task. Each image
consisted of a letter and a digit randomly determined from
their respective stimulus sets, aligned in a row on either
side of the center; the position of the letter and the digit
stimuli (left vs. right) were randomly determined on each
trial (Fig. 2). The digit task required subjects to decide
whether a digit stimulus was smaller or larger than 5,
whereas the letter task required them to decide whether a
letter stimulus was closer within the alphabet to the letters
A or Z. Subjects were instructed to press the ‘‘Z’’ key for
digit stimuli smaller than 5 and letter stimuli closer to A,
and otherwise to press the ‘‘/’’ key; hence the response sets
overlapped between the two tasks. The stimuli remained on
the screen until the subjects responded.
Procedure
Subjects first performed a practice block consisting of
about 50 trials, followed by the experimental portion,
which was divided into three phases. Phases 1 and 3 were
characterized by the trial structure described above (Fig. 2,
top). Phase 2 was identical to Phases 1 and 3 except that a
reward stimulus was presented immediately after the par-
ticipant’s response on each trial (500 ms; Fig. 2, bottom).
Critically, either the letter task or the digit task, but not
both, was reinforced during Phase 2; the reinforced task
was counterbalanced across subjects. For the reinforced
task, correct responses elicited a ‘‘¢5!’’ stimulus indicating
that the participant earned five cents on that trial, and
incorrect responses elicited a blank screen (500 ms). For
the non-reinforced task, correct responses elicited a ‘‘¢0’’
stimulus indicating that they did not earn a reward on that
trial, and incorrect responses elicited a blank screen
(500 ms; Fig. 2, bottom). Note that Phase 1 served as a
baseline condition, Phase 2 contained the critical manipu-
lation to determine whether reinforcement would modulate
performance of the reinforced task, and Phase 3 provided a
means for examining residual effects of the reinforcement
on performance. Before the start of Phase 2 subjects were
informed that one of the tasks (but not both) would be
rewarded with 5 cents for each correct response, and that
they would learn which task was rewarded by exposure to
the feedback. Phases 1 and 3 consisted of 4 blocks of 50
trials each, whereas phase 2 consisted of 6 blocks of 50
trials each. Subjects were provided with written and verbal
instructions for Phases 2 and 3; only verbal instructions
were given in Phase 1. To ensure that participants believed
the bonus was real, they received their total accumulated
earning at the end of each block. On average, they received
7–8 CAN$. Throughout the experiment, subjects were
instructed to respond as fast as they could without sacri-
ficing accuracy.
Results
The data of four subjects were excluded from the analysis
due to high error rates ([21 %1 ), and the data of another
subject were eliminated due to the participant’s failure to
attend to the task instructions, resulting in data set for 59
subjects total (13 males, average age 22). Individual trial
reaction times (RTs) that were greater or less than two
standard deviations (SDs) from the mean were excluded
from the analysis (5 % of the trials eliminated from each
task), and RT analyses were performed on correct trials
only. Our primary analyses focused on the critical experi-
mental manipulation across Phases 1 and 2.
Fig. 2 Event timing for a single trial of the task-switching procedure.
Top Phases 1 & 3, Bottom Phase 2. In this example, the digit task is
reinforced. ITI intertrial interval. Stimulus size is enlarged for the
purpose of illustration
1 All subject error rates were \20 % except for one participant
(20.4 %); the results did not change when his/her data were excluded
from the analyses.
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RT
For the Phase 1 data (Fig. 3, left), a 2-way ANOVA on RT
with trial transition (switch, repeat) and task reinforcement
during Phase 2 (reinforced, not reinforced) revealed a
significant main effect of transition, such that switch trials
(M = 1,187 ms, SD = 259 ms) were slower than repeat
trials (M = 1,090 ms, SD = 208 ms), F(1, 58) = 39.2,
p\ .01, gp
2 = .40, confirming that the tasks elicited a SC.
As expected, no other effects were statistically significant.
For the Phase 2 data (Fig. 3, right), a comparable ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of transition, F(1,
58) = 14.9, p\ .01, gp
2 = .20 (M = 1,027 ms,
SD = 227 ms and M = 991 ms, SD = 204 ms for the
switch and repeat trials, respectively), replicating the SC,
and a significant main effect of reinforcement such that
participants responded faster for the reinforced task
(M = 958 ms, SD = 217 ms) compared to the non-rein-
forced task (M = 1,060 ms, SD = 227 ms), F(1,
58) = 37.7, p\ .01, gp
2 = .39. The interaction of rein-
forcement and transition was not statistically significant,
F(1, 58) = 2.4, p = .13.
Error rates
For the Phase 1 data (Fig. 4, left) a 2-way ANOVA on error
rates with transition (switch, repeat) and Phase 2 task
reinforcement (reinforced, not reinforced) revealed a sig-
nificant main effect of transition, such that error rates were
greater for switch trials (M = 8.7 %, SD = 5.3 %) than
repeat trials (M = 6.5 %, SD = 4.5 %), F(1, 58) = 17.9,
p\ .01, gp
2 = .24, indicating that switch trials were harder
than repeat trials. No other effect was significant. For the
Phase 2 data (Fig. 4, right), a comparable ANOVA
revealed a main effect of transition, with switch trials
(M = 6.8 %, SD = 5.1 %) associated with higher error
rates than repeat trials (M = 5.1 %, SD = 4.1 %), F(1,
58) = 11, p\ .01, gp
2 = .16. There was also a significant
main effect of reinforcement such that the reinforced task
elicited fewer errors (M = 4 %, SD = 5.1 %) than the
non-reinforced task (M = 8 %, SD = 5.1 %), F(1,
58) = 28.7, p\ .01, gp
2 = .33. Importantly, the interaction
of transition and reinforcement was also significant, F(1,
58) = 8.7, p = .01, gp
2 = .13, motivating a follow-up
analysis on SCs. Specifically, the SC in error rates for the
reinforced task was significantly less (M = 0.3 %,
SD = 4.1 %) than the SC in error rates for the non-rein-
forced task (M = 3 %, SD = 6.4 %), t(58) = -2.9,
p = .01, indicating that reinforcement reduced the error-
rate SC for the reinforced task.
Response compatibility effects
We also examined response compatibility effects on per-
formance, calculated as the difference in error rates or
response times between the response incompatible trials (in
which the response mappings of the two tasks did not
overlap) and the response compatible trials (in which the
response mappings of the two tasks overlapped). Separate
ANOVAs with reinforcement, transition, and compatibility
(compatible or incompatible trials) as factors on RTs and
error rates for Phase 1 and Phase 2, revealed a significant
interaction of reinforcement and compatibility on Phase 2
error rates, F(1, 58) = 4, p = .05, gp
2 = .07 (Fig. 5); all
other compatibility effects on RTs and error rates were not
statistically significant (p[ .05). A follow-up paired t test
on error rates in Phase 2 revealed that the compatibility
effect was significantly smaller for the reinforced task
(M = 1.3 %, SD = 2.7 %) than for the non-reinforced task
(M = 3.2 %, SD = 7.3 %), t(58) = -2, p = .05, espe-
cially when switching to the non-reinforced task. Further
Fig. 3 Response times (RTs) for Phase 1 (without reinforcement) and
Phase 2 (with reinforcement). R the reinforced task, NR the non-
reinforced task. The x-axis shows performance separately for switch
and repeat trials. Error bars indicate within-subject standard errors of
the mean
Fig. 4 Error rates for Phase 1 (without reinforcement) and Phase 2
(with reinforcement). R the reinforced task. NR the non-reinforced
task. The x-axis shows performance separately for switch and repeat
trials. Error bars indicate within-subject standard errors of the mean
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analysis revealed that the reduced SC for the reinforced
task was driven by the incompatible trials (Fig. 6): SC for
the reinforced task (M = 0.4 %, SD = 4.5 %) was sig-
nificantly smaller than SC for the non-reinforced task
(M = 4.3 %, SD = 9.9 %), t(58) = -3, p\ .01 on the
incompatible trials but not on the compatible trials.
Phase 3 analyses
We examined Phase 3 separately for potential long-term
effects of reward on performance (Fig. 7). A 2-way
ANOVA on RT (Fig. 7, top panel) with trial transition
(switch, repeat) and task reinforcement according to Phase
2 (reinforced, not reinforced), revealed a main effect of
transition with switch trials slower (M = 1,035 ms,
SD = 219 ms) than repeat trials (M = 951 ms,
SD = 185 ms), F(1,58) = 58.1, p\ .01, gp
2 = .50. Fur-
ther, a main effect of reinforcement indicated that the effect
of reinforcement persisted from Phase 2 to Phase 3; the
reinforced task was performed significantly faster
(M = 969 ms, SD = 192 ms) than the non-reinforced task
(M = 1,017 ms, SD = 212 ms), F(1,58) = 9.5, p\ .01,
gp
2 = .14. There was no interaction of transition with
reinforcement. Similarly, the same analysis on error rates
(Fig. 7, bottom panel) revealed a significant main effect of
transition, with errors greater for switch trials (M = 7.7 %,
SD = 6 %) than repeat trials (M = 5.6 %, SD = 4.7 %),
F(1,58) = 19.7, p\ .01, gp
2 = .25. A main effect of rein-
forcement was also significant, with fewer errors for the
reinforced task (M = 6 %, SD = 5.3 %) compared to the
non-reinforced task (M = 7.3 %, SD = 5.4 %),
F(1,58) = 5, p = .03, gp
2 = .08. The interaction of transi-
tion and reinforcement was not significant. These results
indicate a prolonged benefit of reinforcement on perfor-
mance in the absence of reward for both RTs and error
rates.
Discussion
We examined the task-specific effect of reinforcement on
task-switching performance. During an initial phase of the
experiment, participants switched back and forth between
two simple tasks consistent with a standard task-switching
paradigm. Subsequently, participants continued to switch
between the tasks, but correct performance for one of the
tasks was rewarded. We predicted that reinforcement
Fig. 5 Compatibility effect in error rates. swt to R switch to the
reinforced task, rep R repeat the reinforced task, swt to NR switch to
the non-reinforced task, rep NR repeat the non-reinforced task. Error
bars indicate within-subject standard errors of the mean
Fig. 6 Switch cost (SC) in error rates for the compatible and
incompatible trials in Phase 2. c-R SC for the reinforced task on
compatible trials, c-NR SC for the non-reinforced task on compatible
trials, inc-R SC for the reinforced task on incompatible trials, inc-NR
SC for the non-reinforced task on incompatible trials. Error bars
indicate within-subject standard errors of the mean
Fig. 7 Response times (RTs) (top panel) and error rates (bottom
panel) for Phase 3 (without reinforcement). R the reinforced task, NR
the non-reinforced task. The x-axis shows performance separately for
switch and repeat trials. Error bars indicate within-subject standard
errors of the mean
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would induce faster and more accurate performance for the
rewarded task. Further, we predicted that the pattern of SCs
would dissociate two potential mechanisms underlying the
improved performance, as determined by the relative
degree of control allocated to the two tasks. The simple
RL-based account predicts that rewards would strengthen
the associations between stimuli and responses, resulting in
faster and more accurate performance on the rewarded task
as control is gradually released and task performance
becomes more dominant and automatic (Cohen et al.,
1990). In this case, switching from the non-reinforced
(harder) to the reinforced (easier) task would yield larger
SCs because of the need to disengage control from the
harder task, compared to switching from the easier to the
harder task when there would be little control to disen-
gage—i.e., in a PASC (Fig. 1, left; Monsell, 2003). Con-
sistent with this proposal, Yeung and Monsell (2003b)
observed the development of a PASC when participants
were required simply to practice one of two tasks, making
performance on that task relatively automatic. Conversely,
the HRL-based account predicts that the rewards would
increase the degree of top-down control applied over per-
formance of the reinforced task as a whole by boosting the
activity of the associated task-demand representation (cf.
Cohen et al., 1990). In this case, fast and accurate perfor-
mance would result from increased levels of top-down
control rather than from enhanced processing along the
stimulus–response pathways. Thus switching from the
reinforced (fast and accurate) task to the non-reinforced
(slow and inaccurate) task would yield larger SCs (because
of the need to disengage control from the reinforced task),
than switching from the non-reinforced to the reinforced
task (when there would be little control to disengage)—i.e.,
in a NASC (Fig. 1, right).
Our results are consistent with the HRL-based account.
As is commonly observed, we found that switch trials were
associated with slower RTs and higher error rates com-
pared to non-switch trials. Further, faster RTs and
increased accuracies for the reinforced task compared to
the non-reinforced task indicate that reward receipt
enhanced performance of the reinforced task. This task-
specific effect of reinforcement was obtained above and
beyond any generalized effects of rewards on performance
due to increased overall levels of arousal or motivation
(which would affect both tasks equally but are impossible
in the present study design to distinguish from practice
effects). Note that the improved RT for the reinforced tasks
did not result from a speed–accuracy trade-off: rewarding
correct performance on a given task yielded both faster
RTs and lower error rates for that task relative to the non-
rewarded task (see also Krebs et al., 2011, 2010; Padmala
& Pessoa, 2011). This result is perhaps surprising given
that rewarding correct performance on a particular task
might be expected to lead to greater response caution as
reflected in increased RTs: although subjects were
instructed to respond fast and accurately, there was no
actual time constraint or penalty imposed on slow
responses. Instead, our results indicate that reward moti-
vates the performance of the reinforced task as a whole to
improve both RTs and accuracy.
Critically, consistent with our prediction, we observed
larger error rate SCs associated with the non-reinforced
task characterized by high RTs and high error rates (i.e., an
NASC; Fig. 4, right), in contrast to the more common
finding of large SCs for relatively easy, automatic tasks
characterized by low RTs and low error rates (i.e., a PASC;
Fig. 1, left) (Allport et al., 1994; Yeung & Monsell,
2003a). A comparable effect was not observed for RT,
presumably because the reinforcement contingencies
depended solely on accuracy. High RTs and error rates are
typically understood to reflect difficult task demands
requiring greater top-down control, which in turn prevents
against task disengagement when switching to the easier
task, giving rise to a PASC. However, in the present study,
the reinforced and non-reinforced tasks were counterbal-
anced across subjects, thereby equating the level of task
difficulty as revealed by the absence of any effects of future
reinforcement during Phase 1 (Figs. 3, 4). Rather, we
suggest that reward receipt increased the value of the
associated task, resulting in greater application of top-down
control for that task (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012; see also
Holroyd, 2013; Holroyd & McClure, 2014; Shenhav et al.,
2013). In turn, the heightened control over the fast and
accurate reinforced task stymied switches to the slow and
inaccurate non-reinforced task, resulting in a NASC.
Further, direct reinforcement of the stimulus–response
pathways responsible for task execution is less likely to
account for these SC findings. Although strengthening of
the stimulus–response pathways would indeed make the
reinforced task more dominant, i.e., faster and more
accurate (e.g., Krebs et al., 2010, 2011), such disparities
also facilitate a dynamic shift in control to the non-domi-
nant task, as captured in computational simulations (Cohen
et al., 1990; see also Gilbert & Shallice, 2002). In turn,
these differences in task dominance are observed to give
rise to PASCs, which are said to arise from difficulty in
disengaging control from the harder, non-dominant task to
switch to the easier, dominant task (Monsell, 2003; Yeung
& Monsell, 2003b; but see also Kiesel et al., 2010). Our
observation of NASCs is inconsistent with this account.
Although PASCs have not always been observed (e.g.,
Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, Yeung, & Azuma, 2000;
Yeung & Monsell, 2003a), a systematic examination of this
phenomenon found that the effect occurs mainly under
conditions that maximize interference between the tasks
(Yeung & Monsell, 2003a). For example, PASCs are
704 Psychological Research (2015) 79:698–707
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normally observed in tasks that involve bivalent response
sets, which impede selection of the relevant response, and
in tasks with simultaneously occurring bivalent stimulus
attributes, which impede stimulus categorization (Yeung &
Monsell, 2003a). Because our tasks are characterized by a
strong degree of interference—as demonstrated by the
large response compatibility effects—the simple RL
account would predict a PASC, which we did not in fact
observe.
Further support that reinforcement increased top-down
control over the reinforced task can be seen in the larger
response compatibility effect occurring when participants
switched from the reinforced task to the non-reinforced
task (Fig. 5). Our account suggests that increased control
over the reinforced task particularly impeded switches to
the non-reinforced task when the imperative stimuli
afforded responses that were consistent with both tasks
(Fig. 5., ‘‘Swt. to NR’’). The same finding is also predicted
by a simple RL account, which holds that rewards would
increase the strength of associations between stimuli and
responses for the reinforced task, resulting in an increased
compatibility effect on switch trials relative to repeat trials
for the non-reinforced task (Fig. 5., ‘‘Swt. to NR’’). Cru-
cially, however, the HRL account also predicts that repe-
tition of the non-reinforced task would not result in a large
compatibility effect, as we observed (Fig. 5, ‘‘Rep. NR’’),
because the repetition would not involve any disengage-
ment of control. By contrast, the simple RL account pre-
dicts that the enhanced strength of the stimulus–response
pathways would increase the compatibility effect on repe-
tition trials of the non-reinforced task, as the stronger
stimulus–response associations of the reinforced task
would interfere with performance of the non-reinforced
task irrespective of what task had occurred on the previous
trial. For example, in the Stroop paradigm, the dominant
word naming task interferes with the non-dominant color
naming task regardless of whether the color naming task is
repeated or not (Yeung & Monsell, 2003a). Thus the rel-
atively small compatibility effect observed here on repe-
tition trials of the non-reinforced task (Fig. 5., ‘‘Rep. NR’’)
supports the HRL account rather than the simple RL
account of our findings.
That improved RT and accuracy continued into the third
phase of the experiment, when no rewards were actually
delivered, may suggest long-term learning of control pro-
cesses due to reinforcement (Jung, Baeg, Kim, Kim, &
Kim, 2008; see also Kahnt, Grueschow, Speck, & Haynes,
2011; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009). Consistent with
this possibility, Verguts and Notebaert have proposed that
norepinephrine signals elicited by response conflict
strengthen synaptic connections underlying the application
of top-down control by task-demand units (Verguts &
Notebaert, 2008, 2009). However, the fact that the
asymmetric SC was not observed during phase 3 of the
experiment precludes drawing any firm answers to this
question, because the improved RT and accuracy could
also reflect changes in the strength of stimulus–response
associations. The long-term effect of rewards warrants
future investigation.
A recent study by Kleinsorge and Rinkenauer (2012)
found enhanced task-switching performance for a rewarded
task. In their task, a reward cue on each trial indicated that
the participants either had or did not have a chance to
receive a monetary bonus on that trial. Subsequently, pre-
sentation of a task cue indicated the specific task for that
trial, which thereby determined whether subjects could
actually earn the reward or not. This design yielded four
possible combinations of reward and task cue on each trial:
(1) the reward was available and the task was the rewarded
task, (2) the reward was available and the task was the non-
rewarded task, (3) the reward was not available and the
task was the rewarded task, and (4) the reward was not
available and the task was the non-rewarded task. Note that
subjects could only receive rewards in the first condition.
The authors found that the mere expectation of reward
facilitated performance for both the rewarded and non-
rewarded tasks, indicating that rewards enhanced perfor-
mance overall. Moreover, SCs were not modulated by
whether the task was rewarded or not. Although at first
blush, these results may appear inconsistent with the HRL
account—which holds that reinforcing a specific task
should result in improved performance only for that task—
the strength of the reward-task association may have been
relatively weak in the Kleinsorge and Rinkenauer study,
which allowed for reward acquisition on only one-sixth of
the trials overall.
Our findings provide insight into a few outstanding
questions on the cognitive neuroscience of cognitive con-
trol.2 In particular, an influential theory of automaticity
proposes that the control system facilitates information
processing along neural pathways that implement task rules
(Cohen et al., 1990). This theory was formalized in a
computational model that posited the existence of so-called
task-demand units that, based on their relative levels of
activation, ensured the successful execution of behaviors
associated with relatively weak stimulus–response path-
ways. Although this theory has helped to explain a range of
phenomena, it leaves unspecified how the system selects
what task to execute in the first place as well as how much
control to apply over task performance. We have recently
suggested that task selection can be learned based on
2 Because the current study was not intended to distinguish between
competing accounts of whether the rewards enhance activation of the
reinforced task versus inhibit activation of the non-reinforced task,
future research is needed to investigate this question.
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principles of HRL, which describe a computational
approach for learning the values of temporally abstract
behaviors called options (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012), of
which task sets constitute an elementary type (Botvinick
et al., 2009). Further developments of this idea suggest that
the reinforcement of particular options should influence the
degree of top-down control applied over execution of the
selected task (Holroyd, 2013; Holroyd & McClure, 2014).
Consistent with this position, the current results indicate
that rewards directed toward a particular task can enhance
task performance by increasing control over execution of
that task rather than by strengthening the stimulus–
response pathways that implement the task set.
Current neurobiologically based theories of HRL pro-
pose that the values for task selection and motivation are
learned alternatively in DLPFC (Botvinick et al., 2009;
Botvinick, 2012) or ACC (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012).
Although both accounts hold that DLPFC facilitates top-
down control over neural processing in other brain areas
such as the striatum (Miller & Cohen, 2001), the latter view
proposes that ACC activates corresponding task represen-
tations in DLPFC that then apply top-down control (see
Shenhav et al. 2013, for a comparable idea). Our present
results do not distinguish between these possibilities, but
our proposal is consistent with recent functional neuroim-
aging evidence of the role of ACC in task selection,
switching, and maintenance (Dosenbach et al., 2006;
Forstmann, Brass, Koch, & von Cramon, 2006; Hyafil,
Summerfield, & Koechlin, 2009; Kouneiher, Charron, &
Koechlin, 2009). These considerations suggest that future
fMRI studies would reveal increased ACC activity for the
reinforced relative to the non-reinforced tasks when task
values are modulated as in this study design.
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